



Criminological Characteristics of Individuals Engaged in Recruitment Activities: An Empirical Study Based on a Sample of Inmates



ELIZAVETA S. PROKHORENKO

University of Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia,
prokh-liza@mail.ru, <https://orcid.org/0009-0005-5415-0412>

Abstract

Introduction: the article is devoted to the criminological characteristics of individuals engaged in recruitment activities. Special attention is paid to the study of personality traits of the recruiter and the person being recruited. The *purpose* of the study is to identify the structure of organizations engaged in recruitment activities, the characteristic criminological features of recruiters, patterns of the mechanism of criminal behavior, as well as the victimogenic factors that make the recruited persons vulnerable. The study is based on the use of sociological interviews and questionnaires; the empirical data are processed using a statistical method. *The methodological basis* consisted of methods of formal and dialectical logic. *Results:* based on the analysis of judicial practice and the survey of 22 individuals convicted of terrorism and extremism-related crimes, the structure of the organization engaged in recruitment activities is revealed. The typical composition includes an organizer, a coordinator, a motivator, a recruiter, and accomplices. At the same time, it is noted that the effectiveness of recruitment is ensured by a clear distribution of functional roles and has a multi-level nature. Empirically, it has been established that the main victimogenic factors that increase vulnerability to recruitment influence are the state of socio-psychological maladjustment of the recruit, the underdeveloped nature of value orientations and critical thinking, limited horizons, and a lack of meaningful leisure activities. These factors are deliberately exploited by recruiters, who, regardless of their level of training, are characterized by well-developed communication skills, psychological flexibility, and a strong commitment to the interests of the criminal association. The author has identified a pattern whereby recruited individuals go on to conduct recruitment activities independently – effectively revealing a mechanism of the criminal structure's self-reproduction. *Conclusions:* the author proves the need for a comprehensive approach to preventing recruitment activities that combines the reduction of the victimization of potential recruitment targets with the differentiated impact on recruiters. The results obtained can serve as the basis for developing preventive measures to counter recruitment activities.

Key words: recruitment activities; personality of the recruiter; recruited person; recruitment; victimogenic factors; victimization; organized crime; crime prevention.

5.1.4. Criminal law sciences.

For citation: Prokhorenko E.S. Criminological characteristics of individuals engaged in recruitment activities: an empirical study based on a sample of inmates. *Penitentiary Science*, 2026, vol. 20, no. 3 (75), pp. 304–311. doi 10.46741/27132811.2026.75.3.009.

Introduction

The study of the criminal's personality occupies a central place in criminology and is among the fundamental problems explored by representatives of various scientific schools [1, p. 56]. As is well known, one of the first independent studies in Soviet criminology devoted to the problem of the criminal personality was A.B. Sakharov's monograph "On the personality of the criminal and the causes of crime in the USSR" [2], which laid the theoretical foundation for further study of issues related to the causes of individual criminal behavior. When studying the nature of crime, the Soviet criminologist substantiated the position that social conditions, including unfavorable ones, affect an individual through their individual psychological characteristics, the system of values they have internalized, and the life experience they have acquired. In other words, the same social environment affects people's behavior in different ways: some develop stable antisocial attitudes under its influence, while others maintain law-abiding behavior.

Consequently, to understand the causes of crime, it is necessary to take into account not only the undoubtedly significant general factors that determine criminal behavior, but also how the moral and psychological characteristics of an individual are formed in the process of their development, which determine the tendency toward unlawful behavior.

The collective monograph "The personality of the criminal", prepared by the All-Union Institute for the Study of the Causes and Development of Measures to Prevent Crime edited by V. N. Kudryavtsev, G.M. Min'kovskii, and A.B. Sakharov [3] describes the problem of the criminal personality. This study presents and systematizes theoretical foundations of the doctrine concerning the concept, structure, and classification of the criminal personality, and reveals social mechanisms of its formation and key socio-demographic, criminal-legal, and moral-psychological characteristics of the criminal personality [4, p. 283].

The noted scientific works do not cover the entire scope of criminological research on the criminal personality. In subsequent decades, the study of this problem developed progressively, continuing to occupy one of the significant areas in the works

of leading Soviet and Russian criminologists. A significant contribution to the study of the criminal personality was made by E.A. Antonyan [5], Yu.M. Antonyan [5–8], A.I. Dolgova [9; 10], M.I. Enikeev [6], N.F. Kuznetsova [11; 12], V.V. Luneev [13], I.M. Matskevich [14], V.V. Merkur'ev [15], V.E. Eminov [6; 7] and other authors, whose theoretical and empirical research has largely determined the current state of the doctrine of the criminal personality.

The above allows us to conclude that a study of the mechanism of recruitment activities cannot be complete without examining the personalities of its participants, particularly the personality of the recruiter and the person being recruited.

In the process of preparing the study on countering recruitment activities, the author consistently collected empirical data, as a result of which 420 court verdicts were studied, 205 employees of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation and 334 employees of the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation were interviewed, and static data was collected for the period from 2020 to 2025, including data on the registration of crimes under articles 205, 205.1, 205.2, 205.4, 205.5, 208, 212, 280, 281, 281.1, 281.3, 282.1, 282.2 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.

A separate part of the empirical base was made up of the results of the sociological interview of 22 convicts (15 men and 7 women) serving sentences for crimes under articles 205, 205.1, 205.2, 205.3, 205.5, 208, 210.1, 214, 222.1, 278, 281, 281.3, 282, 282.2, 282.3 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, including actions related to recruitment.

The presented article summarizes and systematizes the obtained results.

Research

In a broad sense, recruitment activities cannot be reduced only to a set of criminally punishable acts provided for by the norms of the Special Part of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. It represents a broader system of deliberate socially dangerous actions, encompassing, in particular, a set of organizational, informational, and ideological background measures [16, p. 65].

The effectiveness of recruitment activities is primarily due to its collective nature and can be ensured solely by the joint efforts of its participants,

who share functional responsibilities among themselves. The author's analysis of sentences issued by courts of general jurisdiction in criminal cases concerning individuals who recruited others to engage in terrorist and extremist activities demonstrates a consistent role-based structure. The principal roles identified are: the organizer, the coordinator, the motivator, the recruiter (acting as the direct perpetrator), and the accomplice (a person involved in the scheme). Each of these roles makes an independent contribution to achieving the criminal outcome, which must be taken into account when developing a system to prevent recruitment activities.

An organizer performs a system-forming function, which includes developing a general strategy for recruitment activities, coordinating areas of activity, defining goals of the criminal association and methods of its functioning, as well as financing processes that ensure the stability and development of the criminal structure. As emphasized in the scientific literature, the personality of the organizer (leader) of a criminal formation is an important element in characterizing a terrorist organization. The leader's personal characteristics and actions in relation to the social environment determine patterns of the creation, stability, and functioning of the entire criminal structure [17, p. 28].

A notable example illustrating the content of the organizational function within the structure of recruitment activities is the verdict of the Moscow District Military Court of September 18, 2018, in case No. 2-36/2018, issued against Babaev M.S., Dzhanatliev Sh.M., Gazimagomedov Kh.A., Makhmadaliev N.E. and Tukiev Z.M.

As established by the court, in Moscow, in May 2016, Babaev M.S. and Dzhanatliev Sh.M. organized a structural unit of the international terrorist organization "Islamic State" (The activities of the "Islamic State" are recognized as terrorist by decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation and are prohibited on the territory of the Russian Federation). Sh.M. Dzhanatliev performed organizational and managerial functions on behalf of the terrorist organization, which included assigning roles to the participants, recruiting new members, providing material support, resolving current operational issues, and organizing recruitment (Appeal ruling of the Judicial Collegium for Military Personnel Cases of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. 201-APU18-55 of January 24, 2019 in case No. 2-36/2018).

A coordinator acts as a link between perpetrators and organizers, which determines their importance within the criminal structure. His/her functions in-

clude receiving instructions from the organizer, transmitting them to perpetrators, ensuring communication between individual structural units, and collecting and transmitting feedback on the progress of the recruitment process. At the same time, the coordinator ensures a level of secrecy that allows the organizer to be distanced from direct interaction with other individuals.

A motivator carries out propaganda regarding potential candidates for recruitment, fostering motivation and interest in further criminal activity among a wide audience. In particular, by publishing offers of quick money-making opportunities on social media and in messaging apps, the motivator lures potential recruits, which is one of the first stages in carrying out recruitment activities, subsequently transitioning into the individual processing by recruiters of a specific candidate who has responded to such an offer and entered the recruitment network. In turn, the motivator is merely a supplier of potential targets for the recruiter. Furthermore, the role of the motivator is to maintain internal cohesion among active participants in the criminal group, including recruited individuals who have joined such a group.

A recruiter (direct perpetrator) is the central figure who directly engages people in the criminal association or encourages them to commit unlawful acts. His/her work is complex and step-by-step in nature and includes searching for potential candidates, assessing the personality of the person being recruited – including identifying their vulnerabilities and needs – applying selected methods of psychological and other forms of influence, and, finally, carrying out the recruitment.

The analysis of the sentences allows us to classify recruiters in terms of their level of professionalism and the methods used: agents of special (foreign) services operating within the framework of state intelligence programs; professional recruiters who have in-depth knowledge of the psychology of manipulation and are capable of improvisation; amateurs whose activities follow standard algorithms (scripts) and are focused on mass influence. Regardless of their level of training, all recruiters are united by a stable commitment to the interests of the criminal association, which is based on ideological motivation or the desire to receive material rewards.

Accomplices (involved individuals) form a group that provides functional support for the recruitment process by supplying the necessary services and resources.

Depending on the nature of the functions they

perform, they can be divided into those who carry out:

- technical functions (ensuring communication by organizing communication channels, providing electronic tools, and supplying material and technical resources);
- information functions (collecting and analyzing data, ensuring secrecy).
- ideological functions (creating and adapting propaganda materials and providing ideological justification for activities).

The analysis of criminal cases enables the classification of recruitment-oriented structures according to their level of organization: spontaneous, low-organized, organized, and highly organized. It is important to note that, depending on the scale and size of the criminal group, a recruiter may simultaneously perform functions of other participants in recruitment activities listed above, which is especially typical for small cells or criminal groups existing at the initial stages of formation.

As an example, the following case illustrates how one individual concurrently fulfilled the roles of motivator and recruiter. Thus, A., who is a supporter of the activities of the “Islamic State” (By the decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, the organization “Islamic State” (“Islamic State of Iraq and Syria”, “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant”, “Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham”) is recognized as a terrorist organization and its activities are prohibited on the territory of Russia), promoted engaging in terrorist activities on his personal page on VKontakte. At the same time, in an effort to recruit individuals into the terrorist activities of the “Islamic State,” he engaged in private correspondence with S. via the Telegram messaging app. He sent her messages urging armed action and the financing of terrorism, while rationalizing the necessity of fighting those who do not adhere to the “Islamic State’s” ideology (Archive of the 1st Eastern District Military Court, 2021, Case No. 1-58/2021).

Thus, the criminal actions of the direct recruiter represent only the final, visible stage of a complex and structured activity, which is based on a multi-level system of preparation, planning, and coordination of the process of involving individuals in unlawful activities. Understanding this structure is of particular importance for developing effective criminological and criminal law measures to prevent the negative social and legal phenomenon under study.

Turning to the criminological characteristics of the recruiter’s personality, it should be noted that it is highly variable determined by both individual psy-

chological traits and affiliation with a specific criminal association. This rules out the possibility of creating a single criminological portrait, since personal characteristics are inextricably linked to the functional role in the criminal hierarchy and the specifics of the criminal organization’s activities.

At the same time, the analysis of the results of psychological assessments of individuals convicted of recruiting others into terrorist and extremist activities shows that they are typically characterized by highly developed communication skills, the ability to win over an interlocutor, and the capacity to flexibly adapt to their psychological characteristics. In addition, among the characteristic features of a recruiter’s personality, leadership qualities, decisiveness, and confidence in their own abilities predominate, combined with low susceptibility to social threats and the absence of pronounced fears. The contradictory combination of autonomy and dependence on the opinion of the reference group is noteworthy. On the one hand, recruiters tend to be independent and resourceful, and on the other hand, they are susceptible to the influence of their significant environment, including higher-level organizers. In interpersonal interactions, rationality, emotional detachment, and adaptable behavior tend to predominate. These traits are frequently paired with aggressiveness, persistence, and a pragmatic pursuit of personal gain.

Based on the above, the term “recruiter” is a person who occupies an active position in the mechanism of reproducing criminal activity and who, due to inherent leadership qualities, intellectual abilities, flexibility of thinking, charisma, emotional stability, low susceptibility to social threats, and a pronounced dependence on the norms of the criminal association, systematically and deliberately performs functions in its interests – namely, the targeted search, selection, and recruitment of new participants, using various methods of influencing the will of the person being recruited.

Of particular interest is the dynamic between the recruiter and the recruit, the vulnerabilities that make individuals susceptible to recruitment, and the influence tactics to which they are most responsive.

First and foremost, it is noteworthy that the vast majority of those recruited were in a state of pronounced socio-psychological maladjustment at the time they were drawn into criminal activity. This pattern is reflected in the growth dynamics of terrorism-related crimes committed by minors, as noted by the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation A.V. Gutsan [18]. Psychological instability, a heightened need for recognition and the sense of

belonging to society, as well as the search for identity and a tendency toward categorical judgments, make the younger generation more susceptible to manipulation and destructive suggestions.

For example, the minor T., convicted under Part 1 of Article 30, paragraph "a" of Part 2 of Article 205, and paragraphs "a" and "c" of Part 3 of Article 222 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, In an interview, he stated that he had first encountered the recruiter on the Steam digital distribution platform for PC games; subsequent communication took place via the secure messaging app Signal. Over an extended period, the perpetrator deliberately exploited the teenager's fragile emotional state — a condition stemming from strained family relationships, conflicts with peers and teachers, the necessity to switch to home schooling, chronic fatigue resulting from balancing studies with night-time work, and persistent financial hardship. As the convicted person himself explained, it had been precisely the despair and internal conflict — which he described as "living mechanically" — that made him vulnerable to manipulation. The recruiter skillfully used trust-based communication and the promise of a large monetary reward, and also created the illusion in the minor that moving an explosive device posed no public danger. It is noteworthy that T. perceived the offer not only as a way to earn money, but also as a personal challenge that allowed him to prove his own financial independence.

Similar mechanisms of influence can be observed in other cases. For example, the convicted A., who was found guilty of participating in the activities of a terrorist organization (Part 2 of Article 205.5 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation), was recruited by a person with whom he had long-standing friendly relations. According to the convicted person, the recruitment was carried out covertly, during regular visits to the mosque, and was accompanied by discussions of theological issues. Over the course of a year, the recruiter provided the respondent with relevant literature and conducted targeted conversations without resorting to direct pressure. At the same time, the convict's need for in-depth religious knowledge and the absence of an authoritative spiritual mentor in his close circle became the decisive factors that led to his involvement in the criminal environment.

It is noteworthy that the convict subsequently began searching for new supporters himself, disseminating information about the organization's activities, but he viewed his role as purely informational, denying any involvement in recruitment. Other respondents who had previously performed

recruitment functions hold a similar position. All of them insisted that the joining of new members was voluntary, and they described their own activities as preaching, informing, and explaining intra-group rules. It is noteworthy that, contrary to obvious logic, the convicted individuals do not want to admit even to themselves that they were engaged in recruitment activities. This can apparently be explained by the fact that, in their perception, recruitment activities were inherently criminal — which, in reality, they undoubtedly are — while they viewed themselves as fighters for a cause. As Yu. E. Suslov rightly points out, individuals involved in extremist activities often become recruiters themselves, which confirms the dynamic nature of their criminal role [19, p. 165].

Individual characteristics of the recruiter and the person being recruited largely determine the choice of specific recruitment methods. The empirical data collected by the author demonstrate that material gain is not invariably the primary motive driving recruits to consent to involvement in criminal activities. A telling example in this regard is the criminal case against M., convicted of committing a crime under paragraphs "a" and "c" of Part 2 of Article 205 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. According to the materials of the criminal case, M. set fire to a car on the instructions of individuals acting in the interests of Ukrainian intelligence services. During the interview, the convicted person explained that her brother had persuaded her to carry out these actions, promising a reward of up to one thousand US dollars for completing the task. However, she admitted that the decisive factor in her decision to commit the crime was not material gain, but her personal attachment to the recruiter (her brother) and her unwillingness to demonstrate weakness and indecisiveness in front of him, since throughout her life he had been an unquestionable authority for her. It is equally telling that the convicted woman did not fully realize public danger of the actions she was committing and did not think about adverse consequences that could result from her criminal actions. Accordingly, she did not even contemplate the possibility of facing actual imprisonment as a consequence. This once again illustrates how readily individuals can be manipulated and underscores the profound distortion of legal awareness among citizens — particularly minors.

As S. B. Kalinina notes, recruiters conduct a detailed assessment of a person's current needs even at the initial stage of identifying potential candidates. In this context, the absence of clear, conscious life goals is a key factor in making a person

vulnerable to recruitment. It creates a void that recruiters can easily fill with compelling yet destructive ideas [20, p. 2].

Scientific literature rightly points out that recruiters' informational influence relies primarily on distorting facts and capitalizing on citizens' lack of awareness or limited knowledge – often stemming from age-related factors or other subjective circumstances [21, p. 383].

Thus, only 18 % of the respondents could give an extensive answer to the question about their meaningful hobbies and preferred literature. Most respondents found it difficult to answer or limited themselves to formal, superficial statements (computer games were most often mentioned as hobbies, and the only literary sources mentioned were prohibited literature distributed within the criminal organization).

The synthesis of the empirical data makes it possible to identify typical risk groups among potential targets for recruitment:

- 1) those exhibiting an underdeveloped personal identity and ideological inconsistency (primarily from the youth environment);

- 2) individuals in conditions of social and spatial isolation;

- 3) individuals experiencing a deep psychological crisis due to difficult life circumstances.

In addition to the factors listed above, the circumstances that increase a person's vulnerability to recruitment influence also include underdeveloped critical thinking, limited worldview, and a lack of meaningful leisure activities. The absence of an individual's own value-based guidelines and stable cognitive interests naturally deprives them of the ability to critically assess information that is received and imposed from outside. As a result, this leads to the development of susceptibility to the simple but emotionally charged ideas conveyed by the recruiter, which are not subjected to doubt or analysis.

Conclusion

The analysis of the empirical data obtained by the author makes it possible to identify a number of patterns characterizing the personality of both the person being recruited and the recruiter, as well as mechanisms of their interaction. In particular, the key victimogenic factors that heighten susceptibility to recruitment include socio-psychological maladjustment, underdeveloped value orientations and critical thinking skills, as well as a narrow worldview and a lack of constructive leisure activities. The listed vulnerability factors are deliberately exploited by recruiters, who, regardless of their level of training, demonstrate highly developed communication

skills, flexibility, and strong commitment to the interests of the criminal association.

The identified pattern of the transition of recruited individuals to independent recruitment activities is of significant importance. This circumstance, confirmed by both empirical data and scientific sources, indicates the presence of a self-reproducing mechanism within the criminal structure, in which the victim of recruitment eventually transforms into its active participant.

Hence, effective prevention of recruitment activities requires an integrated approach combining general and special measures to reduce victimization of potential recruitment targets (primarily through the development of critical thinking, formation of stable value orientations, dissemination of legal knowledge, and obtaining practical knowledge on psychologically stable behavior).

We contend that measures to counter recruitment activities should be grounded in fostering critical thinking and legal literacy. To this end, prevention efforts ought to prioritize the accessibility of education – specifically, by increasing the number of state-funded places in secondary vocational and higher education institutions. Additionally, educational curricula at all levels (schools, colleges, and universities) should incorporate mandatory modules covering media literacy, logical reasoning, and the fundamentals of legal safety. Special attention should be paid to teaching how to recognize manipulative techniques when interacting on social media and in messengers, since informatization inevitably leads to new sophisticated forms of recruitment activities in the information space.

At the same time, it is important to note the significance of expanding the network of free psychological services and crisis centers, so that people experiencing a psychological crisis can get assistance. This measure would mitigate the risk of victimization among the most vulnerable population groups prior to recruiters establishing a trust-based interpersonal connection and inducing them to engage in criminal conduct. At the same time, it is necessary to ensure that teachers and social workers are trained to early identify signs of maladjustment and the risks of increased susceptibility to intrusive ideas promoted by third parties.

It is recommended to prioritize initiatives aimed at expanding the cognitive and value horizons of minors and youth. To this end, state and public institutions should develop and support social projects that offer structured, meaningful leisure activities — including sports clubs, volunteering opportunities, creative studios, and discussion platforms. This is

a critical preventive measure given the escalating spread of harmful and manipulative content in the information environment. Measures to prevent re-

cruitment activities should be aimed at reducing the victimization rate among the population, which will contribute to a reduction in the overall crime rate.

REFERENCES

1. Sakharov A.B. Scientific Issues in Soviet Criminology. *Izvestiya vysshikh uchebnykh zavedenii. Pravovedenie = Bulletin of Higher Educational Establishments. Legal Studies*, 1984, no. 1, pp. 51–57. (In Russ.).
2. Sakharov A.B. *O lichnosti prestupnika i prichinakh prestupnika v SSSR* [On the personality of the criminal and the causes of criminality in the USSR]. Moscow, 1961. 279 p.
3. *Lichnost' prestupnika* [Personality of the offender]. Ed. by Kudryavtsev V.N., Min'kovskii G.M., Sakharov A.B. Moscow, 1975. 272 p.
4. Akchurin A.V. Prerequisites for the emergence and development of modern concepts of the offender's personality. *NOMOTHETIKA: Filosofiya. Sotsiologiya. Pravo = NOMOTHETIKA: Philosophy. Sociology. Law*, 2018, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 279–286. (In Russ.).
5. *Lichnost' prestupnika i profilaktika prestuplenii: monogr.* [Criminal identity and crime prevention: monograph]. Ed. by Antonyan Yu.M. Moscow, 2017. 220 p.
6. Antonyan Yu.M., Enikeev M.I., Ehminov V.E. *Psikhologiya prestupnika i rassledovanie prestuplenii* [Psychology of a criminal and investigation of crimes]. Moscow, 1996. 336 p.
7. Antonyan Yu.M., Eminov V.E. *Lichnost' prestupnika. Kriminologo-psikhologicheskoe issledovanie: monogr.* [Personality of the offender. Criminological and psychological study: monograph]. Moscow, 2026. 378 p.
8. Antonyan Yu.M. *Teoriya chelovecheskoi agressii. Pochemu zhestoki lyudi: monogr.* [Theory of human aggression. Why people are cruel: monograph]. Moscow, 2013. 311 p.
9. *Lichnost' organizovannogo prestupnika: kriminologicheskoe issledovanie: monogr.* [The personality of an organized criminal: criminological study: monograph]. Ed. by Dolgova A.I. Moscow, 2022. 268 p.
10. *Lichnost' prestupnika i ee kriminologicheskoe izuchenie* [Personality of the criminal and its criminological study]. Ed. by Dolgova A.I. Moscow, 2018. 195 p.
11. Kuznetsova N.F. *Prestuplenie i prestupnost'* [Crime and criminality]. Moscow, 1969. 232 p.
12. Kuznetsova N.F. *Problemy kriminologicheskoi determinatsii* [Problems of criminological determination]. Ed. by Kudryavtsev V.N. Moscow, 1984. 208 p.
13. Luneev V.V. *Motivatsiya prestupnogo povedeniya* [Motivation of criminal behavior]. Moscow, 1991. 382 p.
14. Matskevich I.M. Personality of a criminal type (non-mathematical regulation). *Lex Russica = Russian Law*, 2013, vol. 95, no. 5, pp. 509–520. (In Russ.).
15. *Lichnost' uchastnika terroristicheskoi deyatel'nosti: monogr.* [Personality of a participant in terrorist activity: monograph]. Ed. by Merkur'ev V.V. Moscow, 2022. 368 p.
16. Prokhorenko E.S. Countering recruitment activities: criminal law and criminological issues. *Rossiiskii sledovatel' = Russian Investigator*, 2025, no. 9, pp. 60–66. (In Russ.).
17. Vasnetsova A.S. Criminological characteristics of organizers and participants in organized criminal groups with a terrorist focus (the first stage of a criminological study). *Politseiskaya deyatel'nost' = Police Activity*, 2020, no. 6, pp. 37–63. (In Russ.).
18. *Chislo vovlechennykh v terrorizm podrostkov kratno vozroslo, zayavil Gutsan* [The number of teenagers involved in terrorism has increased many times over, Gutsan stated]. Available at: <https://ria.ru/20260319/gutsan-2081749617.html> (accessed May 1, 2026).
19. Suslov Yu.E. Psychological profile of an extremist criminal and their potential victim in the context of cyberspace. *Viktimologiya = Victimology*, 2023, no. 2, pp. 162–170. (In Russ.).
20. Kalinina S.B. Psychological methods of recruiting young people into terrorist organizations. *Nauka. Obshchestvo. Oborona = Science. Society. Defense*, 2018, no. 2 (15), pp. 1–4. (In Russ.).
21. Shcheglov A.V. Countering methods of recruitment into religious extremist organizations. *Vestnik ekonomicheskoi bezopasnosti = Bulletin of Economic Security*, 2016, no. 2, pp. 382–388. (In Russ.).

INFORMATION ABOUT THE AUTHOR

ELIZAVETA S. PROKHORENKO – postgraduate student at the Faculty of Scientific and Scientific-Pedagogical Personnel of the University of the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia, prokh-liza@mail.ru, <https://orcid.org/0009-0005-5415-0412>.

Received June 15, 2026.